Knowledge Center
Issue 18 : Risk Issue
The State of Shareholder Activism
An Interview with Sabastian Niles
Cited in The Wall Street Journal and The American Lawyer
for his “activist defense” work, Sabastian V. Niles focuses on
rapid response shareholder activism & preparedness, takeover
defense and corporate governance at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz in New York, in addition to M&A and special situations.
He advises worldwide and across industries, and has
counseled boards of directors and management teams on
self-assessments, engagement with institutional investors
and proxy advisory firms and navigating activist situations
involving Barry Rosenstein/JANA Partners, Bill Ackman/
Pershing Square, Carl Icahn, Daniel Loeb/Third Point,
David Einhorn/Greenlight Capital, Glenn Welling/Engaged
Capital, Jeff Smith/Starboard Value, Jeffrey Ubben/
ValueAct, Jonathan Litt/Land & Buildings, Keith Meister/
Corvex, Mick McGuire/Marcato, Nelson Peltz/Trian, Scott
Ferguson/Sachem Head, Paul Singer/Elliott Management,
Ralph Whitworth-David Batchelder/Relational Investors
and Tom Sandell/Sandell Asset Management, among many
other activist hedge funds.
In addition to serving as Consulting Editor for the NYSE’s
Corporate Governance Guide, Sabastian’s writings have
been widely published and he has been a featured speaker
at corporate strategy and investor forums like CCMC’s
Capital Markets Summit, the Council for Institutional
Investors, The Conference Board, Europe’s Activism Rising,
the Gabelli Capital Allocation Symposium, the Harvard
Law and Business Symposium on Governance and Activist
Investing and the Society of Corporate Secretaries.
Sabastian received his law degree from Harvard Law
School, where he co-founded the Harvard Association
of Law and Business, and his finance, economics and
information science degrees from the University of
Maryland at College Park, where he won two national
championships and four regional championships in
intercollegiate trial advocacy.
Sabastian Niles: Shareholder activism used to consist of one-off,
isolated approaches that might happen now and again to someone
else. Activism now is a permanent environment of scrutiny
and potential second-guessing, in which public companies and
their long-term strategies may be aggressively targeted and challenged.
The challenge is led by sophisticated, well-advised hedge
funds, some of whom are laser-focused on boosting the stock
price as quickly as possible and by any means necessary, including
through escalating pressure and scorched-earth tactics, and
others of whom may pursue more constructive, open-minded,
behind-the-scenes approaches. I would also distinguish the economic
activism sponsored by hedge funds from the governance
activism driven by some pension funds, labor unions and other
groups. In some cases, that latter kind of activism can inadvertently
pave the way for increased vulnerability to hedge fund
activism and short-term pressures.
We are in a transformed corporate governance and shareholder
engagement environment, in which major institutional
investors, mainstream asset managers and even some pension
funds are pursing enhanced stewardship and deep engagement
and reducing reliance on proxy advisory firms in sincere fur -
therance of long-term value creation. On the other hand, there
are still many in the financial community who need fast returns
and are eager to enlist the “aid” of an activist when their portfolio
needs a boost and share “hit lists.”
In this new environment, companies can either lead and
adapt from a position of strength or be caught off-guard and
flat-footed in the face of an activist challenge.
Sabastian Niles: Demands vary, and we often see the “asks” evolve over
time or be extreme at the outset, perhaps with the implicit
understanding (or hope!) that they might be scaled back in
negotiations. Specific objectives can include engineering a sale
of the company, a breakup of its businesses (perhaps with the
resulting pieces to be separately sold off) or other fundamental
restructuring; blocking or sweetening an announced M&A deal;
changing capital allocation strategies to boost or accelerate buybacks
or other distribution of cash to shareholders, which might
be funded by increasing leverage, monetizing company assets
or reducing reinvestment in the business; improving margins
by cutting costs or capital expenditures; changing the business
strategy or operations; or even replacing the CEO
and the Board through a proxy fight or withhold
campaign. Companies should also understand
more nuanced activist critiques that involve
disputes over a company’s pacing, priorities
or sequencing of business decisions.
As for who gets targeted, some undervaluation
in the current stock price (note, I did not say
underperformance!) is necessary. But sometimes
the better performing a company is, the more
vulnerable it is to serious activism.
"Activism now is a permanent environment of scrutiny and potential second-guessing."
Sabastian Niles: Each activist and situation is different,
and a lot of it depends on the objective in play.
It’s fashionable to say that activists only target
underperformers, but the data and experience
shows that’s not the case. Ironically, sometimes
the stronger the stock price and the company’s
potential, the more the company appears on the
screens of sophisticated activists. Surprisingly,
doing “too well” can drive long-term supportive
shareholders out of the stock when they trade
out and remaining investors may conclude that
the only way to move the needle further is a sale
or breakup of the company. And if a company is
performing well, that caps the activist’s downside,
and if the activist has an approach for increasing
the stock price even more, then it’s all fair game in
their minds.
Empirical studies have shown that the biggest
driver of hedge fund profits from activism
is forcing a sale and capturing the immediate
premium. So with M&A booming and the debt
markets attractive, it’s no surprise there are cases
where there’s an extremely strong performer, and
an activist will come in with a hostile bidder wanting to buy the company.
Alternatively, where an activist is concerned about an M&A or low interest
rate window closing and sees a company in the midst of a turnaround, there
may be pressure to sell or lever up and buyback now rather than wait for the
strategy to bear fruit. Sometimes a company wonders why an activist suddenly
starts pushing for a sale or other immediate action, and it later turns
out that the activist was under pressure from its own investors for returns
and fending off potential redemption requests.
Sabastian Niles: The media amplifies activism, sometimes aggressively so, and is not a preferred
forum by companies for sober debate and analysis of complex situations.
The public dialogue is asymmetrical, with activists becoming personal in their
attacks and issuers rightly reluctant to respond in kind. Companies often complain
that activists co-opt the financial press, getting both airtime and coverage
with a snap of their fingers (or a tweet) and that the press propels activist arguments
and attacks without any real pushback or pressure. This media dynamic
is one of many reasons why we work with companies to keep activism situations
private and out of the public eye to the extent possible. But in fairness, there are
reporters who will work constructively with companies and experienced advisors
to provide even-handed, merits-based coverage. Smart companies
refresh media relationships, prepare statements for potential contingencies
and cultivate respected third-party voices who can knowledgeably
speak on their behalf, all well in advance of an activist challenge.
Sabastian Niles: Yes. I am seeing more aggressive activism of all types in recent
years as capital rushes into activist funds in record amounts, filling
their war chests, and “wolf packs” assemble against companies. Indeed,
activist challenges have accelerated across industries and sectors, at
small-caps through mega-caps, from single-product pure-play firms to
multinational conglomerates, in developed countries as well as in emerging
markets and across company life cycles, hitting newly public companies
as well as later-stage growth and long-lived mature businesses. “Next generation”
and other new activists are crowding the field alongside well-established
funds and sometimes stepping on each other’s toes as they hunt for targets. So it’s
true that no company is too big, too successful, too well-known or even too new to
be a target. And the tactics and themes continue to change too.
Given all the activity, shareholder activism is a clear and present business
risk and should be dealt with as such. In other words, understand the risk,
prevent the risk, and mitigate the risk.
Sabastian Niles: It’s a good question, and companies ask us to review with them our
evolving “screening” criteria that activists use, both from an economic and
governance standpoint, as well as the key early warning signs. Certainly, if a
shareholder or analyst tells you that an activist has been in to see them, that’s
an obvious flag. So is a warning from a sophisticated stock surveillance and
market intelligence firm of unusual trading activity or that an activist is building
a position. Different industries also have unique characteristics to take into
account, and companies should be consistently evaluating what hedge funds
evaluate, such as absolute and relative valuation, performance against peers
and research analysts’ perspectives. Activists can be opportunistic and quick to
seize upon a temporary moment of vulnerability.
When assessing the takeover and activist environment, look for significant
transactions in the industry and activist activity at peers or at companies
that could be a potential acquirer or target of yours. We are seeing activists
encourage M&A not only by publicly calling for a sale or engaging directly
with private equity and strategic counterparties, but also by taking positions
on both sides of a potential business combination and trying to forcibly bring
the parties together or create a new target to be sold by forcing a breakup.
Being an “outlier” without a clear rationale versus peers or the market on
key metrics, stock price, capital efficiency or operational and performance
measures also attracts attention.
The second approach is to temporarily
expand the current board until the
separation event and then allocate the
board members appropriately. While this
approach may require more pre-planning
and a larger advance time, it affords new
directors the opportunity to get to know the
company, the governance structure, their
peers, and the culture—which often translates into more informed decisions
regarding allocation and board composition being made at the right time. Also,
the new independent board members can assist with decisions on related party
transactions, assets, debt, and other costs between the separated companies, which can minimize risk.
Sabastian Niles: In addition to M&A opportunities, heightened scrutiny of business portfolios
and cost structures, and discovering “hidden” assets whose value is “waiting
to be unlocked,” capital allocation and structure is a huge topic in the financial
community. “Excess” cash on the balance sheet and conservative leverage ratios
are always attractive to activists, and companies that have a lot of cash or strong
investment grade credit ratings have to articulate why they are smart to have
and keep it, what their strategy is for it and, with respect to credit ratings or low
levels of leverage, why they are conservative. Investors are looking for more
transparency as to how companies think about deploying capital throughout
various cycles, and companies should not take for granted that the market
understands the rationale behind the company’s choices of what to do or not do.
Sabastian Niles:Would I expect an economic activist without a thesis to attack a company
because of a low “say-on-pay” vote or because proxy advisory firms
think the newest “best practice” is missing or that compensation practices are
“excessive” or “egregious”? No. But can unaddressed executive compensation
issues and misperceptions provide pressure points to be opportunistically
exploited by activists as “wedge” issues? Certainly. And can well-designed
compensation programs that align with long-term strategy, incentivize the
right behaviors and use thoughtful targets provide a buffer against claims that
a company is mismanaged and poorly governed? Absolutely.
"It’s fashionable to say that activists only target underperformers, but the data and experience
shows that’s not the case.”
Sabastian Niles: Each activist challenge is unique. The issues, tactics, team and approaches
will vary depending on the company, the country, the industry, the activist and
the substantive business and governance issues at play, among other factors. In all
situations, however, there is no substitute for preparation and readiness. Companies
should leverage a core team of experienced company-side advisors and study
the approaches that have been developed to prepare for and deal effectively with
activists. Companies are wise to have “state of the art” practices for:
-
Ensuring that the company’s board and management
receive regular updates on the activist,
takeover and governance environment within
the industry, understand their duties, implement
true “best practices” and are well-positioned to
respond and handle an activist situation without
making missteps;
-
Preparing the CEO and other directors to deal
with direct takeover and activist approaches and
handling requests by institutional investors and
activists to meet directly with senior management
and independent directors;
-
Conducting an objective self-assessment to
identify opportunities for strengthening the
company and increasing value for investors
and other stakeholders, mitigating potential
vulnerabilities and responding to investor
concerns, and ensuring that the company’s
strategy is well-articulated and understood;
-
Executing an advance, year-round program of
tailored shareholder engagement that reaches
portfolio managers, governance teams and
proxy voting professionals, involves in select
cases director(s) alongside management where
appropriate and gives the company a strong
sense of investor priorities, perceptions of the
company and how investors would evaluate
the company and vote in the case of an activist
challenge;
-
Attracting investors who will support the company’s
strategies and have investment theses
that line up with the board and management’s
strategic vision and time horizons;
-
Anticipating activist tactics and approaches
and putting “early warning” systems in place;
-
Reviewing the company’s governance and
structural profile, including the shareholder
base, board composition, relevant charter and
bylaw provisions, technology that might be kept
“on the shelf” (such as a rights plan) and legal
developments;
-
Staying abreast of emerging governance expectations and norms;
-
Engaging with proxy advisory firms and responding to their recommendations;
-
Engaging constructively and prudently with an
activist and evaluating their views and proposals
with the assistance of outside advisors;
-
Anticipating public relations and media
dynamics in an activist situation, including by
refreshing media relationships, preparing statements
for potential contingencies and cultivating
respected third-party voices who can
knowledgeably speak on the company’s behalf;
-
Providing compelling evidence of a
company’s progress and performance
and rebutting misleading or incomplete
analyses or criticism; and
-
Preparing for potential litigation
and attempts by the activist to obtain
non-public books and records of the
company, including board minutes
and sensitive analyses.
In our readiness engagements and when
counseling clients in live activist defense representations,
we review more granular guidance for
preparing for or dealing with activist hedge funds.
Sabastian Niles:A surprisingly overlooked item is ensuring
that the General Counsel/Corporate Secretary’s
office is kept apprised on a current basis of buyside
and sell-side sentiment, and what investor
relations personnel and others at the company
who deal with the financial community are hearing.
Any questions that indicate a shareholder or
an analyst believes there are structural, business
or governance changes that would increase
value should be brought to the attention of the
general counsel, so that a team can decide how
best to deal with it, including evaluating what
may be in the investor or analyst’s mind and
how to correct errors or flawed assumptions
before they become more widely disseminated.
This is especially important with sell-side analysts,
as activist hedge funds are increasingly
crediting analysts for their ideas. Once a report
gets out there and is published, other people
are off and running and the issue can become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Good internal communication
may be the single most important
aspect of this. The investor relations team should
also have a robust list of known and occasional
“activists” to check against, so that appropriate
advice can be given before rather than after the
fact for handling activist requests for a call or
meeting, understanding with whom they are
dealing and managing the discussion effectively
without missteps. With respect to shareholder
engagement generally, companies need procedures
to track—and escalate internally as appropriate—messages conveyed,
feedback received and follow-up carried out.
Sabastian Niles: First, true readiness is the foundation for a favorable outcome. The
board should expect periodic updates on steps the company is taking to maintain
a state of preparedness for an activist approach, shareholder perspectives
and sentiment, and as to options and alternatives that have been analyzed by
management and the company’s outside advisors. Failure to prepare for an
activist’s demands or a takeover bid exposes the board to pressure tactics and
reduces the company’s ability to control its own destiny. The psychological
elements of activist attacks, proxy contests and takeover battles are, in many
cases, as significant as the financial, legal and business elements.
Second, Boards and CEOs need to be their own toughest critics. In addition
to robust business reviews, meaningful director evaluation is a key expectation
of institutional investors, and a corporation is well advised to have it,
demonstrate it, and talk to investors about it. However, board trust and confidentiality
are crucial, and boardroom debates over business strategy, direction
and other matters should be open and vigorous but kept within the boardroom.
Activists constantly seek to drive a wedge between the board and the
management team and between the company and its stockholders, and board
consensus in the event of an attack is extremely important. That means that
internal clarity and alignment among the Board and management should be
developed before an activist surfaces. Directors must guard against subversion
of the responsibilities of the full board by activists or related parties and know
to refer all approaches in the first instance to the CEO.
Third, every activist and situation is different, and each board must consider,
and regularly revise, its plans and strategies as needed. Intense director
involvement in key investor meetings and proxy advisory firm engagements
may be necessary as circumstances warrant, and directors are increasingly
involved in “peacetime” shareholder engagement efforts too. In a live activist
situation, well-advised companies continuously gauge whether or not the best
outcome is to make strategic business or other change, perhaps even including
recruitment of new director(s) or possible board representation, in order to
avoid or resolve a proxy fight. Keeping the board fully apprised of the evolving
situation and alternatives and avoiding surprises best positions the company
to achieve success, which can include a negotiated resolution where appropriate,
on favorable terms. But, after carefully and objectively evaluating an activist’s
proposals, boards should be prepared to show backbone if confronted
with demands that are ill-advised, misguided or would undermine long-term
value or the health of the company.
Lastly, and particularly when in the throes of an activist challenge, boards
should help management remain focused on the business and maintain the
confidence and morale of employees, partners and other stakeholders. Activist
approaches can be all-consuming, but continued strong performance, though not
an absolute defense, is one of the best defenses. And when business challenges
inevitably arise, opting for candor and acting in a manner that preserves and
builds credibility with shareholders and other stakeholders is critical.
Sabastian Niles: From the broader risk oversight perspective, boards are
wise to identify external pressures that can push a company
to take excessive risks and consider how best to address those
pressures. An example would be pressures from certain
hedge funds and activist shareholders to produce shortterm
results, often at the expense of longer-term goals, in
ways that might increase a company’s risk profile, such as
on account of taking on excessive leverage to repurchase
shares or payout special dividends or undertaking imprudent
spinoffs that leave the resulting companies with inadvisably
small capitalizations. While such actions may certainly be
right for a specific company under a specific set of circumstances,
the board should focus on the risk impact, too, and be
ready to resist pressures to take steps that the board determines
are not in the company’s or shareholders’ best interest.
No matter how active or activist shareholders may become,
directors cannot not outsource their own judgment and must not
lose sight of their fundamental fiduciary duties.
Sabastian Niles: I think activists will get better results and earn more respect if they
are open-minded about how best to create medium-to-long-term value, avoid
grandstanding or worrying about getting special credit, recognize that board and
management may have superior information and expertise about the business,
and resist the urge to publicly threaten, attack or embarrass a company or its
management and board in order to get their way. In many cases, we have had
productive engagements and, yes, negotiations with activists where we obtain
favorable settlement terms or otherwise help to guide a situation to a mutually
beneficial outcome, including many that never become public battles or where
the activist concludes they would be better served by moving on to another target
or even where, thanks to the company’s own initiatives, the board maintaining
internal alignment and consensus and the right kind of engagement with shareholders,
our client’s shareholders encourage the activist to stand down.
Sabastian Niles: Corporate governance changes have made it harder for boards and management
teams to discharge their fiduciary duties without undue pressure to prioritize short-term stock prices. But the pendulum
may be shifting, and there’s a strengthening view that short-termist pressures on companies are
exacerbated by the excesses of shareholder activism and prioritizing shareholder power. Promoting
sustainable value creation and making our capital markets attractive to those who wish to thrive as
long-term oriented public companies rather than go or stay private are now priorities. A very healthy
debate is under way as to whether we have gone too far in increasing shareholder power and moved too far away from
a “retain and invest” corporate mindset to a “downsize and distribute” mentality. For example, a strong consensus of concern has
emerged about activist attacks that target R&D investment and innovation, demand excessive risk or cost-cutting at the expense
of sustained employment and reinvesting in top-line growth or disrupt well-conceived turnaround plans that simply need
time to bear fruit. Although expectations of boards are at an all-time high and will only increase, particularly
regarding board renewal, self-assessment and shareholder engagement, mainstream institutions
and even some of the most prominent pension funds are increasingly willing to defend and protect
boards and management teams from short-termist pressures if they are satisfied with a company’s long-term plans and
governance practices. In short, we may be moving toward a new paradigm of corporate governance in which major institutional
investors abandon rote reliance on proxy advisory firm recommendations, decline to outsource oversight of their portfolios to
activist hedge funds and ultimately champion and ally themselves with, rather than against, companies.